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CIVIL PROCEDURE SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
In 1991, the Tenth Circuit handed down over 90 cases involving
civil procedure. While many of these cases involved routine application
of precedent in well-settled areas of the law, two areas emerged in which
the court redefined or altered existing procedural law. First, the Tenth
Circuit developed new rules concerning the applicability of sanctions
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, in light of recent Supreme
Court decisions in this area. Second, the Tenth Circuit continued its
trend of allowing district courts increased discretion when disposing of
lawsuits brought by prison inmates pro se.
I. RULE 11 SANCTIONS
A. Introduction
Rule 11, originally promulgated in 1938, consolidated a number of
pleading practices from English procedure', the former Federal Equity
Rules2 , and existing state sanctioning practices. 3 The original Rule 11
simply required an attorney to have a subjective, good-faith belief that a
signed document contained a sound factual and legal basis.4 The rule
allowed a court, at its own discretion, to impose an appropriate sanc-
tion.5 However, by the 1980's, studies indicated that Rule 11 was se-
verely under-utilized; courts were reluctant to impose and parties
reluctant to request the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.6
In response to the considerable confusion surrounding the circum-
stances under which sanctions should be imposed and the standard of
attorney conduct required, the committee significantly amended Rule 11
in 1983. 7 The new language8 of the rule was intended to "reduce the
1. See English Rules Under the Judicature Act, 1935,0. 19, r. 4, and Great Australian
Gold Mining Co. v. Martin, 5 ch. div. 1, 10. (L.R. 1877).
2. See Federal Equity Rules 21 and 24. The Federal Equity Rules of 1912 may be
found at Sup. Ct. R. 21, 24, 226 U.S. 654-55 (1912).
3. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 36 (2d. ed. 1947). For a detailed history of Rule 11, see
5A CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1331 (2d
ed. 1990).
4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938).
5. Id.
6. Mansfield, Compliance with the 1983 Changes in Rules of Civil Procedure, 190 N.Y.LJ. 1,
5 (1983).
7. See Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-99
(1983) reprinted (hereinafter Report). See also RHODES, RIPPLE & MOONEY, SANCTIONS IM-
POSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 64-65 (1981). Note
that Rule I 1 was also amended in 1987 but only to remove gender-biased language. The
substance of the 1983 amendment was not altered.
8. Rule 11, as amended in 1983, provides in relevant part:
The signature of an attorney or a party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
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reluctance of courts to impose sanctions... by emphasizing the respon-
sibilities of the attorney and reenforcing those obligations by the impo-
sition of sanctions."9 Unfortunately, the 1983 amendment did little to
reduce this confusion, as over a thousand judicial opinions concerning
the propriety of Rule 11 sanctions have been handed down since
1983.10 The amount of Rule 11 related litigation is ironic, considering
the Advisory Committee's statement that the 1983 amendment was in-
tended to "streamline the litigation process."' I There is considerable,
continuing debate in the legal and academic communities as to the effec-
tiveness of the rule as it now reads.'
2
In the past two years, the United States Supreme Court handed
down several significant decisions discussing and refining the scope of
and standard of review applicable to Rule 11 sanctions. In Cooter & Gell
v. Hartmarx Corp.,13 the Court held a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses
an action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i) 14 may still be subject to sanc-
tions.' 5 The Court announced that the circuit courts of appeal must
apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a district court's
imposition of sanctions. 16 In order to effectuate the goals of streamlin-
ing the litigation process, the district courts on the "frontlines of litiga-
tion" must be afforded tremendous deference to determine what
conduct violates Rule 11. 17 In Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communi-
cations Enterprises, Inc.,18 the Court held an objective standard of reasona-
bleness applies to the inquiry conducted by represented parties, as well
as attorneys, who sign papers.' 9 The scope of Rule 11 sanctions was
defined as applying to any paper filed or offered to the court as truthful,
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not inter-
posed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation .... If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred... including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Cr. P. 11.
9. Report, 97 F.R.D. at 198-99.
10. Call for Comments, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedures of the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, 131 F.R.D. 335, 344 (1990) (hereinafter Call for
Comments).
11. Report, 97 F.R.D. at 165.
12. See e.g., Melinda G. Baum, The Seven Year Itch: Is It Time to Reamend Rule 11? 40
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 227 (1991). For a bibliography of current articles and
comments on the post-1983 Rule 11, see Call for Comments, 131 F.R.D. at 350-51.
13. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i).
15. Cooter & Cell, 110 S. Ct. at 2457.
16. Id. at 2460.
17. Id. For a thorough discussion of this case, see Martin B. Bailey, Note, Recent Devel-
opment Federal Civil Procedure - Rule 11 - Rule 41(a) Voluntary Dismissal Does Not Bar Sanc-
tions, Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990), 58 TENN. L. REv. 313
(1991).
18. 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
19. Id. at 930. For a thorough discussion of Business Guides, see Jennifer M. Moore,
Note, Sanctioning Clients Under Rule 11: Business Guides Inc. v. Chromatic Communications
Enterprises, Inc., 14 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 913 (1991).
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including affidavits signed by parties.2
0
This past year, the Tenth Circuit considered a number of Rule 11
appeals under the Supreme Court's recent decisions. Unfortunately,
these recent Tenth Circuit decisions do little to ease the uncertainty sur-
rounding the applicability of Rule 11, and instead reflect the confused
state of Rule 11 law both in other circuits and at the Supreme Court
level. 2 1 In Dodd Insurance Services v. Royal Insurance Co.,22 the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate in cases in which plead-
ings contain both frivolous and non-frivolous claims. 23 However, the
court indicated exceptions to this holding that make it unclear exactly
when a complaint containing both non-frivolous and frivolous claims
should be sanctioned. 2 4 Second, in Eisenberg v. University of New Mexico,
2 5
the court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 408 does not exclude from
Rule 11 sanctions an affidavit submitted during a settlement confer-
ence.2 6 The scope of amended Rule 11 includes any paper offered by a
litigant.2 7 Third, the Tenth Circuit upheld a district court's refitsal to
impose Rule 11 sanctions in Hughes v. City of Fort Collins,28 applying the
deferential review standard required by Cooter & Cell. However, the
court indicated that it was not pleased by the district court's refusal to
impose sanctions and indicated that the plaintiff's good-faith argument
for the extension of existing law was about as tenuous as will be toler-
ated.29 Finally, the somewhat related case of In re Byrd, Inc.30 held that
Rule 11 standards and case law apply in reviewing a district court's im-
position of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g).
B. The Cases
1. Dodd Insurance Services v. Royal Insurance Co.
Plaintiff insurance agency (Dodd) sued an insurer (Royal) after
Royal attempted to terminate an agency-company sales agreement.
Dodd alleged ten claims, and Royal moved for summary judgment on
seven of them. The district court adopted a federal magistrate recom-
mended summary judgment on eight of the plaintiff's claims and im-
posed Rule 11 sanctions based on three of the ten claims. The three
claims adjudged frivolous were defamation, breach of fiduciary duty,
and negligence. The court granted Royal thirty percent of its litigation
20. 111 S. Ct. at 928.
21. See SAUL KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE I1 SANCTIONS (1985); Charles M.
Shaffer, Jr., Rule 11: Bright Light, Dim Future, in SANcToNs: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS 1
(Charles M. Shaffer, Jr. & Paul M. Sandier eds. 1988).
22. 935 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1991).
23. Id. at 1158.
24. Id.
25. 936 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1991).
26. Id. at 1134.
27. Id. at 1133.
28. 926 F.2d 986 (10th Cir. 1991).
29. Id. at 990.
30. 927 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1991).
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costs, based on its finding that three claims out of ten were frivolous.3 '
Dodd appealed on three grounds: (1) the three claims were not suffi-
ciently meritless to be considered frivolous for Rule 11 sanction pur-
poses; (2) a complaint that contains both frivolous and non-frivolous
claims does not violate Rule 11; and (3) the court erred in applying a
mathematical percentage approach in determining the amount of sanc-
tions imposed when some claims are frivolous and some are not.
The Tenth Circuit applied the Supreme Court mandated abuse of
discretion review standard of Cooter & Cell v. Hartmarx Corp.,3 2 upholding
the district court's determination that the claims were sufficiently merit-
less. The most important issue was whether pleadings containing both
valid and frivolous claims can violate rule 11. In this regard, the circuits
are split. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold that sanctions
are improper where most of the claims within the complaint are valid.
3 3
The court declined to follow this view and instead followed the view of
the Second and Eleventh Circuits, that a pleading containing a single
frivolous claim can violate Rule 11.34 The court noted that the Supreme
Court, in Cooter & Gell, had admonished the circuits to apply extreme
deference to a district court's conclusions regarding Rule 11 sanctions.
In holding that a single frivolous claim could lead to Rule 11 sanctions,
the Tenth Circuit reasoned that a contrary conclusion would allow a liti-
gant with one or more competent claims to include in his complaint one
or more highly advantageous, yet wholly frivolous, claims, because that
party can be confident that the presence of the meritorious claims will
shield him from sanctions.3 5 The court noted in dictum that, although
the presence of a single frivolous claim may not require Rule 11 sanc-
tions, here the fact that only three of the plaintiff's ten claims survived
summary judgment strongly suggested that sanctions were in order.
The Tenth Circuit attempted to give guidance to the district courts
as to which complaints containing both nonfrivolous and frivolous
claims deserve sanctions. The court compared Burull v. First National
Bank of Minneapolis3 6 and Oliveri v. Thompson,3 7 cases in which the pres-
ence of a single frivolous claim did not warrant sanctions, with Patterson
v. Aiken 38 in which the Eleventh Circuit approved of sanctions for a sin-
31. Dodd Ins. Services, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 935 F.2d 1152, 1159 n.5 (10th Cir.
1991).
32. 110 S.Ct. 2447 (1990).
33. See FDIC v. Tefken Constr. and Install. Co., 847 F.2d 440, 444 n.6 (7th Cir. 1988)
(fact that one argument in an otherwise valid paper is not meritorious does not warrant
Rule 11 sanctions); Burull v. First Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis, 831 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988); Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d
1531 (9th Cir. 1986); but see Frantz v. United States Powerlifting Fed'n., 836 F.2d 1063 (7th
Cir. 1987) (Rule 11 applies to all statements in papers it covers, each must have sufficient
support and be investigated and researched before filing).
34. Dodd, 935 F.2d at 1158 (citing Cross & Cross Properties v. Everett Allied Co., 886
F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1989); Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F.2d 386 (11th Cir. 1988)).
35. Dodd, 935 F.2d at 1158 (quoting Cross & Cross Properties v. Everett Allied Co.,
886 F.2d 497, 505 (2d Cir. 1989)).
36. 831 F.2d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
37. 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986).
38. 841 F.2d 386, 387 (11th Cir. 1988).
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gle frivolous claim.39 The Burull and Oliveri decisions affirmed a refusal
of sanctions where the frivolous claim had little or no appreciable effect
on litigation and the legal argument was not taken seriously by the op-
posing parties.40 Conversely, in Patterson, where the effect and cost of
defending against the single violative claim could be separately proven,
sanctions were in order.
4 1
The court's comparison of these two lines of cases suggests an eco-
nomic approach to the applicability of sanctions. The implication is that
when the costs legitimately incurred in defense of a frivolous claim are
separable from those incurred defending valid claims, sanctions seem to
be in order. However, if the claim is so frivolous that a reasonable per-
son would not have been concerned with defending against it or would
have incurred minimal cost in doing so, then sanctions may not be in
order.
However, in Dodd, the court's decision regarding sanctions is not
consistent with this economic approach. In Dodd, Royal was unable to
separate the costs of defending against the three frivolous claims. The
district court noted that the Supreme Court, in Hensley v. Eckerhart4 2 ex-
pressly rejected the percentage approach, and ordered Royal to resub-
mit its claim, detailing the actual hours spent on defense of the three
frivolous claims.4 3 Royal responded it could not segregate the attor-
ney's fees and costs relating to the three claims, but the previously sub-
mitted figure of $39,050.88 was a "reasonable estimate."
'44
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held the district court erred in impos-
ing sanctions that reflected a percentage of total costs based on the per-
centage of frivolous claims in the complaint. It reasoned that since the
purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter future frivolous claims, the
amount of the sanction should not be determined mechanically.4 5 The
court agreed sanctions were in order, however the case was remanded
for a determination of the correct amount of sanctions.
Under the court's economic analysis approach to the imposition of
sanctions where the complaint contains both frivolous and non-frivolous
claims, sanctions should not be imposed in this case because Royal was
unable to separate its litigation costs incurred solely as a result of de-
fending against the three frivolous claims. Clouding the issue further,
the court relied on the magnitude of sanctions in this case as an indica-
tion the district court concluded that the three claims substantially bur-
dened Royal.4 6 Yet the court failed to notice the district court, in
39. Dodd, 935 F.2d at 1158.
40. See Burull, 831 F.2d at 790; Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1280.
41. 841 F.2d at 387.
42. 461 U.S. 424, 435 n.11 (1983).
43. Dodd, 935 F.2d at 1159 n.5.
44. Id.
45. Dodd, 935 F.2d at 1159 (citing White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 684-
685 (10th Cir. 1990)).
46. Dodd, 935 F.2d at 1159-60.
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determining the amount of the sanctions, merely relied on Royal's esti-
mate of the costs of defending the frivolous claims.
This holding does little to clear up the confusion surrounding Rule
11 sanctions. While it indicates Rule 11 sanctions are proper if eco-
nomic loss results from even one claim in an otherwise valid complaint,
the facts of this case indicate sanctions may be imposed even where it is
impossible to separate the costs of the one claim. Further, this holding
will not discourage some frivolous litigation, in that claims that the court
finds so baseless that no reasonable attorney would have spent any time
or money defending them may not warrant sanctions. Only those claims
causing the opposing party to incur some costs will be sanctioned. This
may lead to the ironic result that utterly baseless claims run less risk of
sanctions than do those with a less tenuous legal or factual basis.
2. Eisenberg v. University of New Mexico
Torres, the attorney representing the plaintiff in an underlying case,
moved for a new trial following a verdict against her client, 47 alleging
the judge's law clerk engaged in prejudicial ex parte conduct regarding
the sending of exhibits to the jury during deliberations and stated to
several people, including Ms. Torres, that she was being represented by
a member of defense counsel's law firm.4 8 Torres filed an affidavit,
signed by herself, in support of the allegations.4 9 The motion was de-
nied, and the district court issued an order to show cause as to why
Torres should not be sanctioned under Rule 11 for failing to adequately
inquire into the truth and accuracy of her affidavit. The hearing was
conducted by Judge Parker after the original trial judge recused himself.
Ms. Torres's attorney requested a settlement conference and filed a sec-
ond affadavit by Ms. Torres. It detailed a second statement made by the
law clerk indicating that she was represented by defense counsel's law
firm.5 0 Following the hearing, Ms. Torres's first affadavit was found not
to violate Rule 11. However without a hearing, Judge Parker ordered a
fine of $250 for violation of Rule 11 on the second affidavit. Tones
challenged the sanction on three grounds: (1) the offending affidavit was
not filed with the court, but instead was part of the settlement negotia-
tions and therefore outside the scope of Rule 11, (2) she was denied due
process due to lack of a hearing, and (3) the court abused its discretion
by imposing a Rule 11 "fine" without a finding of criminal contempt that
would have afforded her the due process protections of Rule 42(b) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 5 1
Torres argued on appeal that because the offending affidavit was
not formally filed, it does not fall under the scope of Rule 11. Torres
pointed to Justice Kennedy's dissent in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
47. Eisenberg v. University of New Mexico, 936 F.2d 1131, 1132 (10th Cir. 1991).






Communications Enterprises, Inc.,52 where he questioned the majority's
holding that any paper filed with the court could be subject to sanc-
tions. 53 The Tenth Circuit court rejected this defense, citing the major-
ity opinion in Business Guides that any paper submitted to the court for its
review, even an affidavit submitted during in camera review and not for-
mally filed, is still subject to the signing requirements of Rule 11.
5 4
Torres argued the second affidavit should be excluded from Rule
11 consideration pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 408.
55
Reasoning the purpose of Rule 408 is to promote nonjudicial settlement
of disputes, 5 6 Judge McKay held that Rule 408 does not protect evi-
dence of unqualified factual assertions, that Torres waived any Rule 408
protection by submitting the affidavit to the court, and that the affidavit
fell under the "evidence set forth for other purposes" exception to Rule
408.
Torres further argued the district court's failure to conduct a sec-
ond hearing denied her due process. Noting that due process is a flexi-
ble concept, 5 7 the court held Torres was given adequate notice under
due process concepts. Citing Eleventh Circuit precedent,58 the court
held an attorney who files court papers cannot claim lack of notice of the
standard of conduct that Rule 11 itself provides. 59 Although Torres
stepped out of her role as an attorney at the time she submitted the
second affidavit, under Business Guides even a represented party who
signs a document bears a personal responsibility to verify its contents.
60
The show cause order also provided adequate due process, which con-
stituted notice reasonably calculated to apprise her of the pendency of
the action under Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
6 1
The court also held the $250 sanction 6 2 was not a "fine," but rather
a "monetary sanction," applying Miranda v. Southern Pacific Transport
Co. 6 3 In Miranda the sanction was distinguished from a fine for willful
52. 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
53. Id. at 939.
54. Id. at 928.
55. FED. R. EVID 408 provides in relevant part:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) ac-
cepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compro-
mising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either
validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim
or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotia-
tions is likewise not admissible .... This rule also does not require exclusion
when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or preju-
dice of a witness.
56. Eisenberg, 936 F.2d at 1134 (citing Bradbury v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 815 F.2d
1356 (10th Cir. 1987)).
57. Ide at 1134 (citing Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1514 (10th Cir. 1987)).
58. Id at 1135 (citing Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1987)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
62. It is more than a little ironic that a $250 sanction generated an eight-page circuit
opinion, obviously consuming valuablejudicial resources, in lighi of the Advisory Commit-
tee's statement that the amended rule was intended to cut down on "satellite litigation."
See 97 F.R.D. at 198-99.
63. 710 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1983).
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misconduct, which included denial of court access, until the fine was
paid. The sanction against Tones did not approach the magnitude of a
fine, thus the more stringent due process requirements of criminal con-
tempt as set forth in Cotner v. Hopkins64 did not apply. Cotner involved a
fine for willful disregard of a court order.65 The court agreed with the
Eleventh Circuit opinion in Donaldson v. Clark,66 holding nothing in the
text of Rule 11 indicates the due process requirement called for in crimi-
nal contempt proceedings be applied in the present case.
3. Hughes v. City of Fort Collins
In this case, the husband and children of a murder victim sued the
City of Fort Collins, its police officers and district attorneys, alleging
that the City's failure to solve a previous murder and apprehend the
perpetrator before he murdered Hughes's spouse deprived plaintiffs of
their constitutional rights.
67
The City moved for dismissal of the claim for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted and requested sanctions pursuant to
Rule 11. After a hearing, the district court dismissed the complaint,6 8
but denied sanctions, believing a good faith argument for the extension
of existing law could be made.
69
Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their complaint, and defendants
cross-appealed the denial of sanctions. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal, and reversed the trial court for "summarily refusing to con-
sider the award of sanctions." 70 On remand, the district court again de-
nied the sanctions, reiterating its belief that a good faith argument for
the extension of existing law could be made.7 1 The City again appealed,
arguing the district court based its denial of sanctions on an "improper
hybridization of the old and new standards mandated by Rule 11.
' '72
Judge Anderson, speaking for the court, upheld the district court's
refusal to award sanctions, relying heavily on the Cooter & Gell abuse of
discretion standard for all aspects of a district court's Rule 11 determi-
nation. This standard of review applies not only to factual determina-
tions, but also to determinations of matters of law.73 Judge Anderson
noted the deferential abuse of discretion standard mandated by Cooter &
64. 795 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1986).
65. Id. at 902.
66. 819 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987).
67. Hughes v. City of Fort Collins, 926 F.2d 986, 987 (10th Cir. 1991).
68. Dismissal was based on a finding that there is no constitutional protection for
members of the public against criminal attacks by third parties. Id.
69. Id. at 987-88.
70. Hughes, 926 F.2d 986 at 988.
71. This is the same reason the court gave for the original denial of sanctions. The
district court re-asserted its reasoning stating that the Tenth Circuit had apparently over-
looked it. Id. at 988.
72. Id. at 989. The City argued that the trial court had confused the old subjective
standard of the pre-1983 Rule 11, with the objective standard required by amended Rule
11. Therefore, they further alleged that the court based it ruling on an erroneous view of
the law under Cooler & Gell.
73. Cooler & Cell, 110 S. Ct. at 2460.
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Gell enhances the dual goals ofjudicial economy and integrity of the trial
courts. The court reasoned that:
[t]he Supreme Court's message is dear. It is not the role of the
circuit court to second-guess the district court's Rule 11 deter-
minations. While we are sympathetic with the burdens this liti-
gation has imposed on the City, we are not the district court,
and we cannot reverse the court simply because, had we been
the triers of fact, we might have decided the case differently. 74
The court agreed with the City that the inquiry required by Rule 11
is now an "objective assessment of 'reasonableness under the circum-
stances,' "75 and the district court confused the present standard with
the pre-1983 standard by interjecting the subjective phrase "good faith
belief" before the objective phrase "formed after reasonable inquiry."
76
Reviewing the denial of sanctions under the present objective standard,
the circuit court presumed, although there was no indication in the oral
ruling, that the district court must have concluded the attorney made an
adequate pre-filing inquiry into the factual basis for the case. Further,
the circuit court found that the trial court determined that the attorney
made a good faith argument for modification of existing law.
77
Although the Tenth Circuit upheld the refusal to impose sanctions,
it clearly indicated its strong disapproval of the district's holding and the
plaintiff's legal theories78 and sternly warned the district to keep abreast
of controlling law. The court warned that the argument for a modifica-
tion of existing law in this case came dangerously close to being "[a]
mere assertion that the controlling law is wrong [that] should, at the
very least, be viewed critically by the district court," and that "[a]n
unadorned and forlorn hope that a court may change settled law at some
future time ought not to be enough."
'79
This case highlights the way in which Cooter & Gell has muddied the
waters of Rule 11. The extreme deference to the district courts, re-
74. Hughes, 926 F.2d at 989 (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)).
75. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11, Advisory Committee Notes).
76. Id.
77. Id. Based on the following statement, the trial court declined to impose sanctions:
I think there is no such constitutional claim; but I think probably there is room, if
one reads Martinez (referring to Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980)), for
inquiring whether these various progeny of Martinez which have been decided in
all these circuits really flow from the words of Martinez or whether there is a possi-
ble challenge there which needs to be further clarified ultimately by the Supreme
Court. Certainly it's established law, I think, in the Tenth, Eleventh, Ninth, Sev-
enth, Sixth Circuits; but whether there is an argument which may ultimately be
resolved by the Supreme Court in carving out an exception to Martinez, I don't
know.
Hughes, 926 F.2d at 990.
78. The court made note of plaintiff's attorney's lack of knowledge and disregard for
controlling law. When the attorney was informed of the Supreme Court's decision in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S.c 189 (1989) (holding that a
state's failure to protect an individual against private violence does not constitute a viola-
tion of the due process clause) and its direct applicability to the case, he responded that
the decision was "horrendous" and that he would distinguish it in a reply brief. No reply
brief was ever filed, nor was the case ever distinguished. Hughes, 926 F.2d at 990 n.3.
79. Id. at 990.
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quired by Cooter & Gell, obviously constrained the Tenth Circuit's ability
to effectively review this case. Even though the trial court had misap-
plied Rule 11, the attorney framed extremely weak legal arguments
which disregarded existing case law, and the defendants had incurred
considerable expense in defending the suit, the circuit was unable to
reverse. It is difficult to conceive of a case in which an abuse of discre-
tion sufficient to reverse under the Cooter & Cell standard of review could
be found. Because inconsistent sanctioning practices between judges
will be upheld, attorneys may never understand the level of inquiry nec-
essary to satisfy Rule 11.
4. In re Byrd, Inc.
The debtor in a Chapter 12 bankruptcy reorganization filed a mo-
tion to assess the value of the estate's primary property. Experts' depo-
sitions were scheduled after the property valuations were submitted. A
creditor served the debtor's expert with a subpoena duces tecum timed
to coincide with the originally sceduled deposition date, although the
deposition was rescheduled for a later date. The creditor sent a second
subpoena, which for unknown reasons never reached the expert.
Although the subpoenas did not comply with procedural rules,8 0 the
debtor did not object to the subpoenas or creditor's method of service.
The subpoenas requested the expert to produce appraisals he pre-
pared for similar properties. Citing "business ethics," he refused to
produce the documents without a court order. The creditor moved for
an order to show cause for the expert's failure to comply with the sub-
poenas, and the bankruptcy court issued the order. At the hearing the
bankruptcy judge quashed the show cause order, finding the subpoenas
unenforceable due to their noncompliance with procedural rules. The
judge also awarded the expert costs and fees in the amount of $5,496.86
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g). On appeal, the dis-
trict court slightly reduced the amount, but upheld the ruling. The
creditor appealed the awards.
Before this case, the Tenth Circuit did not specifically address
either the standard for sanctioning a party under Rule 26(g) or the stan-
dard of review for such sanctions. After reviewing the decisions of other
circuits, that applied Rule 11 standards to Rule 2 6 (g),8 the circuit ex-
pressly adopted their approach. Specifically, the court looked to Cooler
& Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. ,82 and Burkhart v. Kinsley Bank 8 3 in applying an
abuse of discretion standard of review in Rule 26(g) sanction cases. Re-
garding the standards for sanctions, subjective bad faith is not required,
but rather the central issue is whether "the person who signed the
pleading conducted a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law support-
80. Specifically, FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2) and D. N.M. R. 30.1.
81. See Insurance Benefit Adm'rs Inc. v. Martin, 871 F.2d 1354, 1360 (7th Cir 1989);
Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co., 855 F.2d 1009 (2d. Cir. 1988); see also FED. R. Civ. P. Advi-
sory Committee's Note (Rule 26(g) "parallels the [1983] amendments to Rule I 1").
82. 496 U.S. 384, 384 (1990).
83. 852 F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 1988).
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ing the pleading."'8 4 Applying this standard, the circuit held the sub-
poenas were not supported by reasonable inquiries and upheld the
district court's award of costs and fees. This holding provides another
example of the scope of the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Cooter &
Cell, which applies not only to Rule 11 sanctions but also to sanctions
imposed under other rules.
C. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit's 1991 Rule 11 decisions do little to clarify the
confusion surrounding Rule 11 sanctions. The Cooter & Gell standard of
review cemented this confusion by permitting a district court to either
run wild in sanctioning or indiscriminately refuse to sanction the attor-
ney. However, the ruling makes two things clear. First, it is unlikely the
Tenth Circuit will reverse the award of sanctions or refusal to sanction
on appeal. Second, there are, and will continue to be, glaring inconsis-
tencies in the district courts' application of Rule 11 that the Tenth Cir-
cuit cannot address due to the extreme deference given to lower court
decisions. A recurring theme in 1991 cases was the Tenth Circuit's in-
ability or refusal to take action even when the appellate court did not
agree with or approve of the district court's imposition (or denial) of
Rule 11 sanctions.
8 5
II. PRO SE LITIGANTS
A. Introduction
The Tenth Circuit dealt with a number of cases involving pro se
litigants this past year. In these cases prison inmates sued for relief from
various civil rights violations. Congress gave the federal judges who
hear these cases wide discretion in how to deal with them.8 6 For in-
stance, a judge can allow an inmate to proceed without a prepayment of
the fees and costs, 8 7 appoint counsel to represent the prisoner,88 or dis-
miss the action as frivolous or malicious.8 9 However, section 1915
presents a court with several problems. One problem the courts face is
how to differentiate a valid complaint from one factually or legally un-
supportable. In 1978, the Tenth Circuit created a mechanism to aid
judges in determining the validity of a complaint called a Martinez re-
port, named for the case creating it, Martinez v. Aaron.90
In Martinez, several prisoners in a New Mexico correctional facility
brought a section 1983 action91 alleging theft and confiscation of per-
84. See United Mo. Bank of Kansas City v. Bank of N.Y., 723 F. Supp 408, 415 (W.D.
Mo. 1989) (applying Rule 11 standards to Rule 26(g)).
85. See e.g., Hughes, 926 F.2d at 989; Eisenberg, 936 F.2d at 1137.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988).
87. Id. § 1915(a).
88. Id. § 1915(d).
89. Id.
90. 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978).
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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sonal property by the prison guards. To aid its decision regarding
whether to dismiss the case as frivolous, the trial judge ordered the
prison officials to investigate the incident.92 The Tenth Circuit ex-
pressly approved the procedure outlined in this order, finding the re-
port useful for deciding preliminary issues, including jurisdiction under
section 1915(a)9 3 and allegations as to color of state law.
94
Last year the Tenth Circuit handed down two decisions involving
Martinez reports. In Hall v. Bellmon,9 5 the Circuit decided a Martinez re-
port may be considered both as an affidavit for defendant in a summary
judgment motion, and as part of the pleadings for the purposes of a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b) (6).
This decision allowed the court to avoid the procedures established in
Reed v. Dunham,9 6 which held that when documents other than the
pleadings are considered a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is treated as a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment. 97 Since the Martinez report is treated as
part of the pleadings, Reed is inapplicable.
In Mosier v. Maynard,9 8 the circuit elaborated on another aspect of
Hall, narrowing the circumstances under which a defendant prison offi-
cial can use a Martinez report as an affidavit in a motion for summary
judgment. Hall limited the use of a Martinez report in cases where the
plaintiff presented conflicting evidence. 99 Mosier went one step further,
negating the effects of the Martinez report in a motion for summary judg-
ment by using the plaintiff's complaint as an opposing affadavit.
A civil rights suit brought by a prison inmate pro se under section
1915100 has many hurdles to pass before it is allowed to proceed to trial.
92. The court order states inter alia:
(3) Officials responsible for the operation of the New Mexico State Penitentiary
are directed to undertake a review of the subject matter of the complaint: a. to
ascertain the facts and circumstances; b. to consider whether any action can and
should be taken by the institution to resolve the subject matter of the complaint;
and c. to determine whether other like complaints ... are related to this com-
plaint and should be take up and considered together.
(4) In the conduct of the review, a written report shall be compiled and filed
with the Court. Authorization is granted to interview all witnesses including the
plaintiffs and appropriate officers of the New Mexico State Penitentiary ....
(5) All reports made in the course of the review shall be attached to and filed
with defendant's answers to the complaint.
Martinez, 570 F.2d at 319.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988).
94. Martinez, 570 F.2d at 319.
95. 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991).
96. Reed v. Dunham, 893 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1990).
97. Id. at 287 n.2. The court stated:
[flurthermore, once it is determined.., that a particular claim is not subject to
dismissal under § 1915(d), a requested disposition of that claim premised upon
materials outside the pleading should be treated as a motion for summary judg-
ment, with due regard for the requirements of notice and opportunity to respond
specified in FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
Id.
98. 937 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir. 1991).
99. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991). "The court is not author-
ized to accept the factual findings of the prison investigation when the plaintiff has
presented conflicting evidence." Id.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988).
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Federal judges dispose of the cases in a variety of ways, including dis-
missal as frivolous under section 1915(d), 10 1 dismissal for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted 10 2 and summary judg-
ment. 10 3 Each of these has a different set of requirements applied in
different circumstances. However, the lines between the three are be-
coming blurred as the courts actively eliminate the procedural distinc-
tions in order to make it easier to dispose of a frivolous lawsuit.
The use of the Martinez report as an affidavit and as an attachment
to the pleadings contributed to the elimination of those distinctions.
Hall v. Bellmon effectively eliminated a distinction between dismissal for
failure to state a claim and summary judgement by allowing a Martinez
report to be considered an attachment to the pleadings.' 0 4 In McKinney
v. Okla. Dept. of Human Services,105 the circuit eliminated another distinc-
tion between the types of dismissal. After comparing dismissal under
section 1915(d) with dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 12(b)(6), the court announced a new rule allowing sua sponte dis-
missals of a pro se litigant's action under Rule 12(b)(6).
Section 1915(d) 10 6 allows a court to appoint counsel to represent
an indigent party. However, if the suit is frivolous or legally unsup-
ported, the court need not appoint counsel. The Tenth Circuit gives a
trial judge broad discretion to deny an indigent plaintiff's request for
the appointment of counsel. In 1985 in McCarthy v. Weinberg, the Tenth
Circuit ruled a district court decision will not be overturned unless "the
lack of counsel results in fundamental unfairness."' 0 7 The court
adopted the guidelines the Seventh Circuit set forth in Maclin v.
Freake.10 8 In deciding whether to appoint counsel, the court should con-
sider the merits of the litigant's claims, the nature of the factual issues
raised, and the complexity of the legal issues.10 9 This year the circuit
decided two cases based upon McCarthy: Long v. Shillinger I 10 and Wil-
liams v. Meese. I I' These cases do not change the holding of McCarthy but
simply follow it indirectly by explicitly following Maclin.
B. The Cases
1. Hall v. Bellmon
Plaintiff, a Native American state prisoner, brought a pro se action
alleging violation of his civil rights. Specifically, Hall alleged he was de-
nied his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion by the confis-
101. Id. § 1915(d).
102. FED. R. Cxv. P. 12(b)(6).
103. FED. R. CIv. P. 56.
104. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1112.
105. 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
107. 753 F.2d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 1985).
108. 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981).
109. Id. at 887-89.
110. 927 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1991).
111. 926 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1991).
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
cation of his medicine bag and talisman, destruction of his property, and
forced compliance with the prison grooming code.
1 12
The district court considered and dismissed each of plaintiff's
claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Although
on appeal the plaintiff claimed the district dismissed his claims as frivo-
lous under section 1915(d), the Tenth Circuit concluded the only plausi-
ble reading of the district's memorandum opinion was that the case was
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.1 13 Plaintiff argued on appeal that the court erred in consider-
ing the Martinez report in dismissing his claim under Rule 12(b)(6).'
1 4
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Typically, when the court
considers materials outside the pleadings, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is
treated as a motion for summary judgment, requiring the plaintiff be
given notice and an opportunity to respond with affidavits or similar evi-
dence before the court considers the motion. 11 5 However, the Tenth
Circuit held a Martinez report may be treated as an attachment to the
plaintiff's complaint for purposes of Rule 12(b) dismissal "[w]hen the
plaintiff challenges a prison's policies or established procedures and the
Martinez report's description of the policies or procedures remains un-
disputed after the plaintiff has an opportunity to respond." 1' 6 In sup-
port of its holding, the court looked to precedent from the First,
1 17
Third, 1 18 Eighth, 119 Ninth 120 and Eleventh 12 1 Circuits. The court also
noted that the Third Circuit disagreed, holding in Rose v. Bartle 122 that
affidavits, in contrast to other written documents attached to the com-
plaint, 123 may not be considered in granting a dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6).124 Also noted is the contrary ruling of the Second Circuit in
Goldman v. Belden 125 that it is improper to consider documents attached
to defendant's motion to dismiss. 12 6 The Tenth Circuit reasoned it was
appropriate for the district court to consider the Martinez report because
the purpose of the report is to identify and clarify issues plaintiff raises
in his complaint, to develop a basis for determining whether the plaintiff
112. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1111-12.
113. Id. at 1112. The court noted that the district court never characterized plaintiff's
claims as frivolous. Dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is only proper when a claim is
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory. Id. at 1109.
114. Id. at 1112.
115. See Reed, 893 F.2d at 287 n.2.
116. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1112-13.
117. Sullivan v. United States, 788 F.2d 813, 815 n.3 (1st Cir. 1986).
118. Chester County Intermediate Unit v. Penn. Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.
1990).
119. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986).
120. AMFAC Corp. v. Arizona Mall, 583 F.2d 426, 429-30 (9th Cir. 1978).
121. Quiller v. Barclays-Am./Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (1lth Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986).
122. 871 F.2d 331, 339-40 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989).
123. See Chester County, 896 F.2d at 812.
124. Rose, 871 F.2d at 339-40 n.4.
125. 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985).
126. Id. at 1066.
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has a meritorious claim, 12 7 and to assist the court in the broad reading
of the pro se litigant's pleadings, which was held to a less stringent stan-
dard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers Haines v. Kerner.
128
2. Mosier v. Maynard
Mosier v. Maynard was a civil rights action brought by a prisoner
against Oklahoma prison officials alleging violation of his right to free
exercise of religion by requiring him to comply with the grooming code.
The district court ordered a Martinez report.' 29 The defendants filed a
motion to dismiss, which the district court converted to a summary judg-
ment motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and plaintiff
appealed,13 0 claiming that the district court improperly granted sum-
mary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact existed concern-
ing the reasonableness of the prison grooming code. An exemption to
the grooming code can be obtained only if the prisoner supplies exter-
nal documentation concerning the sincerity of his religious belief from
reputable, non-family members. Plaintiff supplied no documentation,
although he supplied other forms of proof.'
3 '
The Tenth Circuit, applying de novo review,1 32 reversed and re-
manded the case. In Hall v. Bellmon, 133 the court held a Martinez report
can be treated as an affidavit, but the court cannot accept the factual
findings of the prison investigation when the plaintiff presents conflict-
ing evidence. 134 The court, treating plaintiff's complaint as an affidavit,
found conflicting evidence was presented.' 3 5 The court allowed plain-
tiff's complaint to be treated as an affidavit after finding the complaint
was based on personal knowledge and sworn under penalty of perjury
and thus met the procedure requirements of Rule 56.136 The court
ruled, in the face of this conflicting evidence, summary judgment was
not proper because the factual statements attributable to counsel con-
tained in defendant's brief do not constitute summary judgment evi-
dence. Therefore, the defendants had no support either by affadavit or
in their brief upon which the district court could rely in granting sum-
mary judgment.1
3 7
3. McKinney v. State of Oklahoma Department of Uuman
Services
The plaintiff brought a pro se section § 1983 civil rights complaint
127. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1112.
128. 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
129. Mosier, 937 F.2d at 1522. See Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978).
130. Mosier, 937 F.2d at 1522.
131. Id. at 1522-23.
132. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and (e).
133. 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991).
134. Id. at 1111-12.
135. Mosier, 937 F.2d at 1524.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1525.
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alleging various violations arising out of his felony conviction and a ju-
venile proceeding involving his minor children.13 8 The district court
held the Eleventh Amendment barred the plaintiff from proceeding
against the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, found his allega-
tions against the other defendants "frivolous, improper, and totally de-
void of merit" 13 9 and dismissed the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C
§ 1915(d).
140
The circuit upheld the dismissal. In doing so, the Tenth Circuit
announced a new rule concerning the propriety of sua sponte dismissals
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6).141 The Supreme Court
in Neitzke v. Williams 142 discussed the dismissal power of a judge under
section 1915(d) but expressly declined to rule on the propriety of sua
sponte dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6). The Tenth Circuit adopted the
holding of the District of Columbia Circuit in Baker v. Director, United
States Parole Comm.,143 that "a trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte
without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief."' 14 4 Typi-
cally, a plaintiff is allowed notice and an opportunity to amend before
the court acts on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.' 4 5
However, following the District of Columbia Circuit's reasoning, the
Tenth Circuit announced a sua sponte dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
not reversible error when it is "patently obvious" the plaintiff could not
prevail on the facts alleged and allowing him an opportunity to amend
his complaint would be futile.'
4 6
4. Long v. Shillinger
A state prisoner in Wyoming brought a pro se action against the
prison warden under section 1983147 alleging civil rights violations con-
sisting of denial of due process afforded prisoners under Wyoming's ex-
tradition act. 148 The district court ordered the defendant warden to
submit an affidavit describing his version of the events leading to the
violations alleged in the complaint. "49 After the defendant filed the affi-
davit, the court ordered the plaintiff to submit a more definite statement
of damages and documentation thereof. Defendant then filed a motion
for summary judgment based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and
qualified personal immunity.' 5 0
138. McKinney v. State of Okla. Dept. of Human Serv., 925 F.2d 363, 364 (10th Cir.
1991).
139. Id. at 364.
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
141. McKinney, 925 F.2d at 364 (the underlying case was not dismissed under FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), but under 28 U.S.C. 1915(d)).
142. 490 U.S. 319 (1989).
143. 916 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
144. Id. at 726 (quoting Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987)).
145. McKinney, 925 F.2d at 365.
146. Id.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
148. Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-3-201 to 227 (1987).
149. See Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978).
150. Long v. Shillinger, 927 F.2d 525, 526 (10th Cir. 1991).
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The district denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, en-
tered judgment against the defendant in his official capacity and
awarded nominal damages of one dollar. Plaintiff filed a motion to alter
or amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59,
which the district court denied.
151
The plaintiff appealed, arguing the district court abused its discre-
tion by refusing to appoint counsel. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict's decision. Following Maclin v. Freake,15 2 the circuit held the district
has wide discretion to appoint counsel for indigents under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(d) and decisions denying counsel will not be overturned unless so
unfair they impinge on due process rights.'
53
5. Williams v. Meese
The plaintiff filed a civil rights action alleging discrimination in as-
signing prison jobs, deprivation of personal property and retaliation for
filing grievances. After most of the defendants answered the complaint,
Williams filed a motion seeking the appointment of counsel pursuant to
section 1915(d).1 54 The district court did not specifically rule on the
motion to appoint counsel but instead dismissed the entire action for
failure to state a claim for relief' 55
The Tenth Circuit remanded the case, having found that Williams
stated two valid claims for relief. Further, the circuit ordered the district
court to consider the motion to appoint counsel "in light of the factors
set forth in Maclin."'
156
C. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has made it increasingly easy
for district courts to dismiss a lawsuit brought by an inmate. During the
survey period, the court continued that trend. The use of the Martinez
report was expanded into a tool for prison officials that can be used
either as a summary judgment affidavit or as part of the pleadings when
a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is appropriate. The utility of the Martinez re-
port is tempered only by rules that prevent its use when an inmate can
present conflicting evidence. Further, procedural rules that differentiate
section 1915(d) dismissals, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals and summaryjudge-
ment from one another are being eroded, making it easier for a district
court to dispose of an inmate's claim at the pleadings stage. An attorney
could assist an inmate to avoid a dismissal or an adverse judgment at an
151. Id.
152. 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981).
153. Id. at 886.
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
155. Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1991).
156. Id. at 996-97. See Macin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981).
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early stage. However, under the current Tenth Circuit standards a dis-
trict court will rarely be compelled to appoint one.
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